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What Conflict Minerals Rules Tell Us 
about the Legal Transplantation of 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Standards without the State: From the 
United Nations to the United States to 
Taiwan 
Chang-hsien Tsai and Yen-nung Wu 
Abstract: To resolve global political and scholarly concerns over conflict min-
erals (“CM”) produced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighbor-
ing regions, two kinds of CM-related disclosure rules (or “CM rules”) come in-
to play in regulating their use: government-mandated laws such as Section 1502 
of the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States (hereinafter “Sec. 1502”) and trans-
national voluntary codes such as the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition 
(“EICC”) Code of Conduct. The creation of both of these CM rules could be at-
tributed to the promotion of such concerns by the United Nations. This article is 
the first attempt to unpack and closely consider the process of two distinct types 
of CM rules that are probably transplanted into Taiwan through global supply 
chains. 
This article joins a growing body of literature that deepens our understanding of 
the channels and objects of legal transplants. The findings of the Taiwanese 
case study are important for two reasons. First, in terms of the transplant pro-
cess or channels, some Taiwanese companies have started to follow CM rules 
due to their supply contracts, demonstrating that applicable CM rules might 
have been transplanted into Taiwan through private channels such as supply 
contracts, rather than through the formal public channels of legal transplanta-
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tion initiated by the government. Second, but just as importantly, with regard to 
transplanted objects, what further distinguishes this article from prior studies is 
that the Taiwanese case study could indicate that Taiwanese suppliers comply 
with CM rules established by the EICC more prevalently than those promulgat-
ed under the Dodd-Frank Act. If so, this would imply that when it comes to 
adopting or implementing transnational corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) 
standards in suppliers’ countries or jurisdictions, private CSR standards written 
by non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) or industries themselves in a bot-
tom-up approach are more effective or more easily accepted than public stand-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The domestic armed conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Con-
go and its adjacent countries have caused severe humanitarian crises and 
have, for a long time, been a critical issue internationally. According to the 
final report provided by the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of 
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (the “Panel of Experts”) sent by the United Nations (“UN”), it 
is concerning that some business transactions involving natural resources 
may have financed armed conflicts within the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and its neighboring regions.1 Specifically, tin, tungsten, tantalum, 
and gold (known collectively as “3TG”)2 are minerals often used in high-
technology manufacturing; they are called conflict minerals (“CM”) be-
cause in many cases their production in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and neighboring regions are probably controlled by armed groups.3 
However, as foreign buyers may not be aware of this damaging situation, 
the Panel of Experts has cooperated with the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) to illuminate this issue for the 
business sector in the western world.4 The UN Security Council has clearly 
indicated that international society should cooperate to prevent financial 
profits made from exploiting natural resources being funneled into the 
funds supporting domestic armed conflicts, and that Member States should 
ensure that domestic industries are aware of the origin of the minerals they 
use.5 
In addition to national governments and local non-governmental or-
ganizations (“NGOs”) concerned about the CM issue, foreign NGOs and 
businesses, especially those that utilize certain minerals in their manufactur-
ing, also started to care about this issue.6 One representative example is the 
Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (“EICC”), which founded the 
Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (“CFSI”) in 2008, a general survey on 
conflict-free smelters and refiners, together with the Global e-Sustainability 
                                                     
 1 Letter from the U.N Secretary-General, to the President of the Security Council, ¶¶ 4, 
10-11, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027 (Oct. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Illegal Exploitation] (Rep. of the 
Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003)). 
 2 See GLOBAL WITNESS, Conflict Minerals, https://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/ 
conflict-minerals/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2018); Nadine Hawa, Conflict Minerals in Supply 
Chains, FSC Rules Breached in Asia and WWF and Coke Expand Cooperation, ETHICAL 
CORPORATION (Sep. 3, 2013), http://www.ethicalcorp.com/supply-chains/ngowatch 
-september-2013 [hereinafter Nintendo under Fire]. 
 3 Illegal Exploitation, supra note 1, ¶¶ 9-10. 
 4 Id. ¶¶ 10-12, 20-21. 
 5 S.C. Res. 1857, ¶¶ 6-7, 13, 15 (Dec. 22, 2008). 
 6 See, e.g., GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 2; Enough Project, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/conflict-minerals. 
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Initiative (“GeSI”).7 The “private” CM rule-making by the EICC further re-
quired its members to avoid using CMs as part of their code of conduct.8 
Later, national legislators also embarked on “public” CM rule-making, 
with the United States setting the trend of introducing CM-related laws.9 
Specifically, whereas the Trump administration has launched a potential re-
think of the current CM rules adopted by the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (the “SEC”),10 Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”),11 by amend-
ing the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, required U.S. public compa-
nies to carry out CM due diligence investigations (“CM investigations”) 
and disclose the possible use of CM in their manufacturing process sourced 
from the war-ravaged Congo and adjoining countries in Africa.12 Subse-
quent to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, it was not only U.S. businesses 
that worried about difficulties in implementing CM disclosures; businesses 
overseas, e.g., parts and materials manufacturers in Japan, were also con-
cerned about the effect created by the new CM rule, even though it was laid 
down by a foreign government.13 In addition, Taiwanese electronics manu-
                                                     
 7 See Responsible Minerals Initiative, http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/about/ (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2018) 錯誤! 超連結參照不正確。(formerly known as Conflict-Free Sourc-
ing Initiative (CFSI)). The EICC, the alliance of US-based electronics industries for corpo-
rate social responsibility, has been cooperating with GeSI (the Europe-based organization 
promoting sustainability in the ICT industry) to develop “the Conflict-Free Smelter (CFS) 
program, which starts with the audit of smelters/refiners and is expected to be used as a 
means to validate trading from there through the downstream supply chain by inspecting 
whether conflict minerals that fund armed groups have entered the supply chain.” JEITA Re-
sponds to Conflict Minerals Provision of the U.S. Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, JAPAN ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 
ASSOCIATION, (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.jeita.or.jp/english/topics/2012/0823/ 
20120823_en.pdf. 
 8 See infra Part II.B (discussing CM rules made by the EICC). 
 9 David Zaring, Financial Reform’s Internationalism, 65 EMORY L.J. 1255, 1279-81 
(2016). 
 10 See infra Part II.C (discussing the current CM rules adopted by the SEC). 
 11 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012). 
 12 See infra Part II.C (discussing the US CM rule-making). The EU CM rule is at the final 
draft stage and the current proposed rule would apply to all “conflict zones” around the 
world, while its US counterpart only applies to the Democratic Republic of Congo and the 
neighboring region. See ROPES & GRAY LLP, The EU Conflict Minerals Regulation – Fre-
quently Asked Questions and Take-Aways for Downstream Companies (or Why Should I 
Care About Yet Another New Supply Chain Regulation?), https://www.ropesgray.com/news 
room/alerts/2017/09/The-EU-Conflict-Minerals-Regulation-Frequently-Asked-Questions-
and-Take-Aways-for-Downstream.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2018); Marcia Narine Weldon, 
Did the EU Learn from Dodd-Frank When Enacting its Conflict Minerals Rules?, BUSINESS 
LAW PROF BLOG (June 17, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/06/ 
did-the-eu-learn-from-dodd-frank-when-enacting-its-conflict-minerals-rules.html. 
 13 See, e.g., Nintendo under Fire, supra note 2; Tetsuji Santazono, US Conflict-Mineral 
Rules Rattle Global Supply Chain, NIKKEI ASIA REVIEW (May 15, 2014), 
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facturers were also impacted by the U.S. CM rule, either because they listed 
shares in the U.S. stock market, or because they served directly or indirectly 
as a supplier to U.S. buyers.14 
The aforementioned phenomena reflect that many industries have al-
ready outsourced their functions to suppliers overseas or applied a “frag-
mented” manufacturing structure, where components of a single product 
may be manufactured by contract suppliers in various countries.15 There-
fore, a U.S. buyer will need cooperation from its foreign suppliers—
possibly in the form of supply contracts—to satisfy the requirements of rel-
evant rules, which are either hard public/regulatory laws or soft voluntary 
rules.16 This article thus explores the practices of Taiwanese suppliers’ 
compliance with CM rules, illustrating legal transplantation through private 
contracting in a globalized world in the case of CM rules, and tests whether 
the U.S. legislators’ expected and desired extraterritorial goal of Section 
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (hereinafter “Sec. 1502”) to indirectly regulate 
an entire global supply chain can be met.17 The Taiwanese case study could 
reveal that some Taiwanese companies have made supply-chain transparen-
cy efforts due to their supply contracts, thus suggesting that relevant corpo-
rate social responsibility (“CSR”) standards, whether of a non-domestic 
public or a voluntary private nature, have been transplanted into Taiwan. 
This article will join a growing body of literature that deepens our un-
derstanding of the channels and objects of legal transplants. The findings 
are important for two reasons. First, in terms of the channels of legal trans-
plants, from the supplier’s point of view, when they try to meet require-
ments laid down by their buyers, they are also “complying” with the buy-
ers’ domestic laws, or with transnational voluntary codes of conduct 
indirectly included in supply contracts. It is especially intriguing that this 
extraterritorial effect of domestic laws in a buyer’s home country may take 
place with CM rules being transposed to a supplier’s host country via pri-
vate contracting channels. This phenomenon, resulting from the globaliza-
tion of business outsourcing, might illustrate a legal transplant in the mod-
                                                                                                                           
http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20140515-The-bitter-divide/Politics-Economy/US-conflict-
mineral-rules-rattle-global-supply-chain. 
 14 Yihua Li & Jingwei Wang, Mei Guo “Chong Tu Kuang Chan” Jie Lou Yao Qiu Dui 
Tai Wan Qi Ye De Chong Ji [The Impact of U.S. “Conflict Minerals” Disclosure 
Requirements on Taiwanese Businesses], 327 KUAI JI YAN JIU YUE KAN [ACCT. RES. 
MONTHLY] 28, 31 (2013) (Taiwan). 
 15 Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 749–
50 (2014). Previous studies on car manufacturers also found this kind of fragmented manu-
facturing structure. See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Outsourcing in a 
Global Economy, 72 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 135, 135 (2005). 
 16 See Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor 
Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 722 (2009); see 
also infra Part II for further discussion. 
 17 See infra Part III. 
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ern sense in comparative law studies. Specifically, a rule (be it a govern-
ment-mandated law or a voluntary code of conduct) could be transplanted 
into a host country and might be obeyed by foreign suppliers to an extent. 
In this case, such a rule is indirectly transferred through private contracting 
across borders. This would exemplify the private implementation or en-
forcement of CM rules under global supply chains in particular, or transna-
tional private governance of CSR standards in general. As opposed to legal 
transplantation through public channels initiated by a sovereign government 
organ, the Taiwanese case study could be interpreted as another type of le-
gal transplant via private channels in a globalized world.18 
Second, but just as important, when it comes to legal transplants, this 
article can be further distinguished from prior studies in that the Taiwanese 
case study could indicate that Taiwanese suppliers comply with the CM 
rules established by the EICC more prevalently than those promulgated un-
der the Dodd-Frank Act. This could indicate that when it comes to adopting 
or implementing transnational CSR standards in suppliers’ countries or ju-
risdictions, private CSR standards written by NGOs or industries them-
selves in a bottom-up approach would be more effective, or widely accepta-
ble, than public standards such as state laws enacted by a foreign national 
government in a top-down approach. 
The article is structured as follows. Part I covers the literature on legal 
transplants and private governance in general as well as private governance 
through global supply chains in particular, and provides a conceptual 
framework for the legal transplantation of CSR standards. Part II outlines 
the CM rules involved in the Taiwanese case study and Part III makes a 
case for legal transplants through private contracting in a globalized world 
by analyzing Taiwanese suppliers’ compliance with applicable CM rules. 
Finally, the conclusion summarizes and draws policy implications from our 
major findings. 
 
II. LEGAL TRANSPLANTS THROUGH PRIVATE 
CONTRACTING IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 
A Legal Transplant Primer 
The term “legal transplant,” from a comparative law perspective, usu-
ally indicates the phenomenon of a domestic law being transferred across 
borders into another country or jurisdiction.19 Alan Watson coined the term 
in the 1970s, although it was not commonly used until later.20 The practice 
                                                     
 18 See infra Part I (illustrating the matrix for legal transplantation of CSR standards). 
 19 JOHN GILLESPIE, TRANSPLANTING COMMERCIAL LAW REFORM: DEVELOPING A ‘RULE OF 
LAW’ IN VIETNAM 3 (2006). 
 20 John W. Cairns, Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants, 41 GA. J. 
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of legal transplantation, however, has a long history, and is a familiar phe-
nomenon in the history of law.21  
Historically, there were no fixed patterns of legal transplants, which 
depend on the transplant background and the transplant society. The scale 
of legal transplants may vary from transferring legal systems wholesale dur-
ing the age of colonization,22 to accepting a whole set of laws and values 
during times of war,23 to voluntarily importing “superior” legal systems 
through a formal legislative process in the transplant country.24 Legal trans-
plantation may also take place owing to other political interactions between 
states, such as compliance with WTO-related agreements,25 or harmoniza-
tion with western-business laws backed by legal harmonization projects, 
which began in the 1990s.26 
The legal transplants mentioned above were initiated by legislators or 
regulators in a home government with the following exemplified incentives 
of receiving a transplant and corresponding patterns of legal transplants.27 
For instance, it might be a “best choice” made by legislators after carefully 
comparing different solutions in different legal systems.28 In addition, di-
rectly borrowing an existing law may be cost-effective for legislators, 
whereas the costs for society of adopting new laws cannot be ignored.29 
Moreover, even if intending to borrow existing foreign laws, legislators in 
the transplant country might not have actually thoroughly examined all ex-
isting foreign laws, but could easily import legal systems from another 
country that seemed to be far superior; although this transplant may seem 
practical, importing laws without thoughtfully considering how they fit into 
another domestic legal order may raise adaptation concerns.30 
                                                                                                                           
INTL’L & COMP. L. 637, 640 (2013). 
 21 See Mathias M. Siems, The Curious Case of Overfitting Legal Transplant, in THE 
METHOD AND CULTURE OF COMPARATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARK VAN HOECKE 
133, 133 (Maurice Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds., 2014); Gillespie, supra note 19, at 3-4. 
 22 Id. at 4. 
 23 Id. at 4-5. 
 24 Id. at 11. 
 25 Id. at 9. 
 26 Id. at 5, 8-9. 
 27 For a complete description of the incentives and motivations behind legal transplants, 
see, e.g., Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal 
History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 
843–67 (2003) (presenting four types of legal transplants based on the motives of tranplant 
countries: (i) The Cost-Saving Transplant; (ii) The Externally-Dictated Transplant; (iii) The 
Entrepreneurial Transplant; and (iv) The Legitimacy-Generating Transplant). 
 28 MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 192 (2014). 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id. at 193; Chang-hsien Tsai, The Failure of Corporate Internal Controls and 
Internal Information Sharing: A Conceptual Framework for Taiwan, 45 HONG KONG L.J. 
469, 497 (2015) (illustrating that “merely transplanting foreign ‘advanced’ corporate law 
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Although commentators question whether imported laws will take root 
in the new land and function just as they did in their country of origin,31 le-
gal literature has also indicated that transplanted laws are mostly considered 
to remain functional to some extent, while the focus should be placed on 
“choos[ing] and design[ing] legal transplants as well as possible.”32 Take 
Taiwan for example: legislators often take a “direct transplantation” ap-
proach, which is to borrow supposedly better solutions sourced from laws 
of such advanced economies as the United States; Taiwan’s government re-
quired public companies to establish independent directors and audit com-
mittees, in order to follow internationally common practices of corporate 
governance, although those specific regulatory tools may not be completely 
compatible with the existing Taiwanese business law environment.33 
In general, common practice in legal transplant studies is to examine 
the transfer of statutory or regulatory laws across boundaries through gov-
ernment branches such as public legislative or regulatory channels as well 
as the effects they would generate in legal cultures of importing countries, 
or how the laws would evolve in a new culture. Nonetheless, as statutes or 
regulations in an exporting country are sometimes transferred through non-
state actors, non-governmental channels (such as multi-national corpora-
tions and other private entities, such as NGOs) may also play an important 
role. Specifically, in a globalized world where nations are inevitably linked 
by cross-border transactions and transnational manufacturing chains, how 
the global market and global supply chains can affect the transfer of statutes 
and regulations has actually become a popular topic.34 This article provides 
another example of legal transplants via private contracting: the transplanta-
tion of such CSR standards as CM rules (be they foreign government-
mandated laws or voluntary codes of conduct established by NGOs) 
through private procurement contracts underlying global supply chains. 
Although some ink may have been spilled in attempts to discuss legal 
transplantation through private contracting, what distinguishes this article 
from others is that the Taiwanese case study suggests that Taiwanese sup-
pliers comply with CM rules developed by the EICC more prevalently than 
those enacted under the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act, indicating that private stand-
ards in a bottom-up approach might be more effective and widely accepta-
ble than public ones in a top-down approach, when it comes to adopting and 
                                                                                                                           
provisions into local regulatory infrastructure may not prove a success-guaranteed solution 
to existing corporate governance problems.”). 
 31 SIEMS, supra note 28, at 196. 
 32 Id. at 197-98. 
 33 See Tsai, supra note 30, at 470-72, 497; In-Jaw Lai, Fa Zhi De Yi Zhi: Cong Gong Si 
Lu Dao Du Li Dong Shi [Legal Transplants—From the Kung-ssu-lü (Company Law) to the 
Independent Director], 84 TAIPEI UNIV. L. REV. 1, 29-30, 37-40 (2012). 
 34 Lin, supra note 16, at 713-15. 
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implementing transnational CSR standards.35 
 
Legal Transplants and Transnational Private Governance 
In the era of globalization, more and more non-state actors appear to 
be able to act as regulators. For example, the term “global administrative 
law” refers to the phenomenon that cross-national organizations are gradu-
ally performing legislative and regulatory roles that, in the past, belonged 
solely to national governments. Along this line, there are five types of glob-
al administration: (1) regulation by international organizations composed of 
national governments, such as the UN Security Council and its committees; 
(2) cross-national cooperation among domestic governmental regulatory 
agencies, such as the operation of the Basel Committee; (3) regulation by 
national regulatory agencies according to international treaties or other sim-
ilar agreements; (4) hybrid structures where governments cooperate with 
private organizations; and (5) regulation solely by private bodies (private 
NGOs) that have substantive regulatory functions, mainly exemplified by 
the International Standardization Organization (“ISO”).36 
Among the aforementioned global administrative schemes, some 
scholars have turned their interest to the final type: private regulatory bod-
ies. Some commentators have suggested the idea of “non-state market-
driven (NSMD) governance” to explain the source of these private regulato-
ry bodies’ power: the pressure from markets (including consumers or other 
concerned parties) has driven the heads of regulated organizations (e.g., en-
terprises) to take necessary actions, and the “governance” goal is attained 
via this channel.37 In this case, the regulated organizations comply with 
“voluntary codes” (for example, international standards, certification 
schemes, codes of conduct, and the like); those voluntary codes are “not 
legislatively required,” and hence lack the power of traditional laws.38 
Therefore, when studying private regulatory schemes on a global scale, 
the regulatory schemes operated by NGOs are also referred to as “transna-
tional private regulation” (TPR) regimes.39 TPR regimes are important be-
cause it is more difficult for national government organs to regulate private 
                                                     
 35 See infra Part III. 
 36 See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 20-23 (2005); see generally Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword: 
Global Governance as Administration–National and Transnational Approaches to Global 
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2005). 
 37 See, e.g., Kernaghan Webb, Corporate Citizenship and Private Regulatory Regimes: 
Understanding New Governance Roles and Functions, in CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE 39, 41 (Ingo Pies & Peter Koslowski eds., 2011). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational 
Private Regulation, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 1, 1 (2011). 
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cross-border activities, so a transnational regulatory scheme is necessary.40 
For transnational enterprises operating under these regulatory schemes, 
pressure (usually from outside) for adoption, implementation, or enforce-
ment would force them to consider complying with voluntary codes. For 
example, in the area of human rights, many international standards were set 
up by NGOs, which also serve as active monitors by keeping an eye on 
those enterprises.41 Apart from pressure from NGOs, some investors may 
also use their votes to influence managerial decisions (i.e., a voice response 
to dissatisfaction with organizational behavior under Albert Hirschman’s 
conceptual framework), or even select investment targets or sell their shares 
in a public market based on one company’s CSR performance (i.e., an exit 
response under Hirschman’s framework), which is called socially responsi-
ble investment (“SRI”).42 The pressure from transnational markets has be-
come more significant in this era of globalization because globalization 
makes it harder for national governments to regulate activities overseas, or 
for concerned stakeholders in a host country to request the company head-
quarters in their home country to take the responsibility for injuries caused 
by local foreign subsidiaries or affiliated legal entities.43 Therefore, a cross-
border regulatory regime is required in order to hold multinational enter-
prises (“MNEs”) responsible for negative effects resulting from their over-
seas activities, such as outsourcing for manufacturing.44 Nevertheless, as 
mentioned above, the rules laid down and promoted by private organiza-
tions are voluntary per se; even if those who adopt the rules violate any of 
them, there might not be any direct way to impose a punishment.45 Some-
times domestic laws such as contract laws are still necessary when market 
pressure is insufficient.46 
When it comes to who plays a rule-making role in private regulatory 
regimes, private organizations without governmental regulatory power are 
in the central position of being able to set up rules that should be followed 
by their members, and the rules are “enforced” via market pressure. Several 
types of private regulators include standards development organizations, as 
explained below, writing private standards for users to voluntarily obey in 
                                                     
 40 Id. at 2. 
 41 Id. at 7-8. 
 42 Lloyd Kurtz, Socially Responsible Investment and Shareholder Activism, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 249, 257-58 (Andrew Crane et 
al. eds., 2008). 
 43 Gregory R. Day, Private Solution to Global Crisis, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.  1079, 1090-
91 (2015). 
 44 See id. at 1092-96. 
 45 Deirdre Curtin & Linda Seden, Public Accountability of Transnational Private 
Regulation: Chimera or Reality?, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 163, 169 (2011). 
 46 See Day, supra note 43, at 1082-83, 1095-97. 
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conducting business.47 Although in the past, international standards mostly 
concerned technical standards “that address network externalities,” recently 
more environmentally oriented private regulatory standards, such as those 
on greenhouse gas emissions that “address social and environmental exter-
nalities,” have been promulgated.48 A type of a standards development or-
ganization is a hybrid organization consisting of industrial associations and 
NGOs: for instance, the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”) tackles forest 
management via cooperation between NGOs such as the World Wildlife 
Fund and companies such as retailers or manufacturers in wood-related in-
dustries.49 Another common type of the voluntary code is codes of conduct 
or regulatory standards developed by private firms to apply to themselves 
only; most large MNEs also have their own supplier codes of conduct that 
they require their suppliers to comply with.50 One issue of concern is how to 
enforce those voluntary rules, as sanctions are to some extent necessary. 
Examples of enforcement mechanisms of these voluntary rules include ex-
pelling members from voluntary programs in the case of a severe violation 
of the rules, and refusing to procure materials from code-violating suppli-
ers.51 Occasionally “naming and shaming” is considered a fairly powerful 
tool, e.g., via tagging offending suppliers with rule-breaking signs, or refus-
ing to assign recognition or certification to them, in order to generate sig-
nals for buyers or consumers expressing concerns; these entities also “con-
tribute to the sanction by denying a company’s ‘social license to 
operate.’”52 
In a variety of fields, these voluntary rules already play important roles 
in guiding business behavior, as a category of regulatory measures with ac-
tual effects. Therefore, we might tend to recognize the importance of pri-
vate regulation in the context of regulatory competition, or the market for 
law.53 If we think that law itself possesses the functions of social norms or 
social institutions, voluntary codes established by private organizations, as 
one of the social norms or social institutions possibly compete with public 
                                                     
 47 Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 
291, 301 (2014)  (Generally speaking, “private regulators of different types carry out the 
three elements of regulation: setting, implementing, and enforcing standards.”). 
 48 Id. at 304-05. 
 49 Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the 
Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47, 51-53 (2006). 
 50 McAllister, supra note 47, at 307. 
 51 Id. at 314. 
 52 Id. at 314-16. 
 53 For a further explanation of how demand and supply dynamics shaping regulatory 
competition (or the market for law) constrains regulating jurisdictions from disregarding 
business demands and from imposing excessive regulation,  see generally Chang-hsien Tsai, 
Demand and Supply Forces in the Market for Law Interplaying through Jurisdictional Com-
petition: Basic Theories and Cases, 1 EAST ASIAN L. J. 1 (2010). 
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or regulatory laws.54 In terms of rulemaking by MNEs and NGOs, the rules 
they choose and how they choose the rules may generate additional im-
portant effects.55 These common private regimes established by private ac-
tors sometimes fill the gap with their quasi-regulatory effects where statuto-
ry laws are nonexistent or inflexible.56 Private regimes might ultimately 
affect statutory laws or even be merged into public laws; there have already 
been some examples of this.57 For instance, governmental agencies could 
directly endorse private regulatory regimes; the Hazards Analysis and Criti-
cal Control Points (“HACCP”) regulation established by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) illustrates endorsed self-regulation.58 
However, when cooperative production or outsourcing is required 
through a transnational supply chain across multiple countries, how to 
maintain control of overall production in a global marketplace is an immi-
nent problem, for example, in that there is an absence of effective legal and 
regulatory infrastructure.59 Large global buyer firms may seek suitable vol-
untary codes of conduct for supply chain management; third-party assur-
ance thus has been regarded as the measure for ensuring the realization of 
the goals these voluntary codes would achieve.60 This may, to an extent, ac-
count for the rise of the third-party assurance industry with the ISO as a 
representative contributor.61 
In recent years, the third-party assurance industry has gradually been 
performing an important role in “a private sector compliance and enforce-
ment infrastructure,” even “providing a substitute for public legal and regu-
latory infrastructure in global commerce.” This industry has provided a 
novel institutional structure “through which private commercial exchange 
                                                     
 54 Dan Wielsch, Global Law’s Toolbox: Private Regulation by Standards, 60 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 1075, 1076-77 (2012); Peer C. Zumbansen, Neither ‘Public’ nor ‘Private’, 
‘National’ nor ‘International’: Transnational Corporate Governance from a Legal Pluralist 
Perspective, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 50, 51-52 (2011). 
 55 Standard contract terms were used as an example. If one such term is adopted by mul-
tiple companies, then it may evolve into a standard within this group of companies; further-
more, the influence of this standard will become even larger if being used by industry asso-
ciations or similar organizations. It might also become an international standard once it is 
used globally. However, this kind of generally applicable “standard” has not gone through a 
formal legislative process, and therefore different legitimacy concerns embedded in similar 
standards should be taken into consideration.  Wielsch, supra note 54, at 1078-79. 
 56 Id. at 1080. 
 57 Id. at 1081. 
 58 McAllister, supra note 47, at 322-23. 
 59 Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 
33 J. CORP. L. 325, 327-28 (2008). 
 60 Id. at 336-37. 
 61 Id. at 331. For an in-depth treatment of the ISO,  see generally CRAIG N. MURPHY & 
JOANNE YATES, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO): GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS (2009). 
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may be regulated for essentially public purposes” while engaging in activi-
ties whose purpose “in the past would be considered ‘public’ and ‘regulato-
ry’ in nature, and left to the authority of government.”62 
When parts of the production process are assigned to suppliers in other 
countries, in order to ensure that their quality of production meets the pur-
chasing company’s internal standards, global buyers from time to time rely 
on monitoring services provided by the third-party assurance industry.63 
Furthermore, as more weight has been laid on the concept of CSR in recent 
years, many SRI institutional investors (including public pension funds) are 
looking at the environmental and social performance of their portfolio com-
panies. Therefore, MNEs need to monitor whether their suppliers meet cer-
tain CSR standards in order to lower the risks resulting from any negative 
effect of not meeting CSR standards within global supply chains.64 Com-
mon CSR-related standards directly established by NGOs include Social 
Accountability 8000 (“SA 8000”) set up by Social Accountability Interna-
tional, providing standards for international labor and human rights protec-
tion,65 and voluntary CSR codes developed within industries such as forest-
ry.66 Facing various CSR standards, some businesses voluntarily adopt 
voluntary CSR standards and hire their own third-party certifiers to certify 
that CSR norms are implemented and enforced throughout their supply 
chains.67 These certifications and third-party assurance may thus lower the 
cost for players in global supply chains to acquire information about how 
others comply with required standards, and it may be cost-effective for 
businesses to engage professionals in specific fields to monitor compliance 
practices of their contracting counterparty, or to act as reputation intermedi-
aries.68 
As a result of serving as monitors as well as entities to issue certifica-
tions, these third-party assurance firms have gradually been acquiring the 
ability to ensure that monitored subjects comply with corresponding volun-
tary codes of conduct. Along this line, they have also come to play a truly 
regulatory role not merely in the substantive sense that they facilitate “the 
                                                     
 62 Blair et al., supra note 59, at 329. 
 63 Id. at 336-37. 
 64 Id. at 337-39. 
 65 SA 8000 is a standard based on international humanitarian conventions, and on the top-
ic of protecting labor rights within corporations through internal control schemes.  See Social 
Accountability International,See SA8000® Standard and Documents, SA8000® STANDARD, 
http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=937 (last visited Jul. 
3, 2016). 
 66 Meidinger, supra note 49, at 74 (citing the FSC, an international body accrediting or-
ganizations to certify that timber and forest products meet the FSC standards for sustainable 
forest management). 
 67 Blair et al., supra note 59, at 342-44. 
 68 Id. at 355-56. 
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transmission of global ‘rule of law’ norms of acceptable business behavior 
to new parts of the world,”69 but also in the procedural sense: in performing 
certain contract-facilitating and contract-enforcing functions, “the assurance 
service can perhaps be understood as importing ‘rule of law’ procedural 
norms into countries where legal institutions are weak.”70 
 Supply Contracts as a Tool for Transnational Private Governance 
As mentioned above, voluntary standards and third-party certifications 
have played large roles in the implementation and enforcement of CSR 
norms, both between businesses and their customers and between business-
es.71 
Across the current global marketplace, the importance of subcontract-
ing suppliers is indeed high, in consideration of the fact that many global 
brands have actually outsourced most of their manufacturing to their for-
eign suppliers; this kind of transactional structure also implies that global 
corporations must build relationships with their foreign suppliers in an ever-
expanding set of manufacturing activities.72 Monitored by the media, 
NGOs, SRI analysts, and even global buyers’ own CSR auditors or verifi-
ers, the issues that receive particular attention are human rights, employ-
ment, and ethical or environmental performance in the manufacturing pro-
cess some way down global supply chains.73 
To lower the reputational risk incurred from higher-risk suppliers, 
some enterprises have started to devote more efforts to supply chain CSR 
management, and some have tried to integrate CSR codes into their risk-
management policies or the strategies they use to select suppliers.74 This 
developing situation may indicate a type of private governance where sub-
contracting suppliers are regulated by their buyers in implementing and en-
forcing CSR codes.75 
Previous studies focusing on supply relationships found that recently, 
                                                     
 69 Id. at 329. See also id. at 338 (furnishing an explanation of how supply chain pressures 
lead to the externally dictated legal transplant by saying that “developed country business 
standards and norms are being propagated worldwide”). 
 70 Id. at 356-57. 
 71 See supra Part I. 
 72 Grossman & Helpman, supra note 15, at 135. 
 73 Doreen McBarnet & Marina Kurkchiyan, Corporate Social Responsibility through 
Contractual Control? Global Supply Chains and ‘Other-Regulation’, in THE NEW 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 59, 62-63 
(Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2009). 
 74 Id. at 63-64. 
 75 Id. at 67 (“Some [MNE] manager reported the unwelcome realization that by taking on 
CSR responsibilities they have acquired a greatly expanded role. In effect they are stepping 
into the shoes of the government in the supplier countries, by policing and enforcing the non-
commercial law of the land”) (alteration in original). 
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supply contracts no longer comprise solely traditional contract terms such 
as prices, but also CSR criteria, with protection of labor rights as a main ex-
ample.76 Buyers77 have incentives to require their suppliers to obey the 
aforementioned CSR norms or standards, especially in suppliers’ countries 
that lack sufficient proper substantive law or enforcement mechanisms, thus 
filling the regulatory gap between buyers’ and suppliers’ countries.78 Simi-
lar results were also found in a famous study on disclosed U.S. supply con-
tracts; supply contracts have already been used as a tool to regulate foreign 
suppliers on CSR issues such as environmental protections.79 
Among Taiwanese corporations, there are also examples of being 
“regulated by supply chains”. For instance, when Apple Inc. was criticized 
by the media due to undesirable working conditions in their supplier facto-
ries that did not meet related standards, not only was the buyer, Apple, un-
der pressure, but their main supplier, Foxconn (an Apple contractor head-
quartered in Taiwan but with major factories located in China), was also 
required by Apple to improve the working environment in their Chinese 
factories.80 
In terms of transnational private governance (or TPR), global purchas-
ing companies have actually been regulating their foreign suppliers to meet 
the CSR standards required or expected by the marketplace in supply 
chains. The buyers may hence be viewed as performing a regulatory role 
traditionally played by governments alone. Supply contracts of this kind 
may then function as a private governance regime.81  
A New Taxonomy of Legal Transplants of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Standards 
While feeling the pressure applied from supply contracts, suppliers 
tend to satisfy buyers’ requirements on CSR issues in most situations to 
keep supply contracts.82 In such relationships, regulatory networks woven 
                                                     
 76 Id. at 65. 
 77 For the purposes of this article, “buyers” generally refer to the enterprises acting as 
buyers in a supply contract, although they may be the firms directly selling products to end 
consumers or the suppliers in another contract at another stage of the same supply chain. 
 78 McBarnet & Kurkchiyan, supra note 73, at 66. Therefore, the control exerted through 
supply contracts could be regarded as a possible mechanism for implementing international 
codes of conduct, with MNEs’ “private law” potentially making up for failures in “state law” 
in suppliers’ countries. Id.  
 79 Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting 
in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 916-17 (2007). 
 80 See Barbara J. Fick, Corporate Social Responsibility for Enforcement of Labor Rights: 
Are There More Effective Alternatives?, 4 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2014); Parella, supra 
note 15, at 779-80. 
 81 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 943. 
 82 Parella, supra note 15, at 784. See also Lin, supra note 16, at 731 (“Since global buy-
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by contracts might turn buyers into private regulators through CSR stand-
ards, norms, or codes that are implemented or enforced through supply con-
tracts.83 If those rules that are incorporated into supply contracts are public 
or state laws in buyers’ countries, they may result in the domestic laws of 
buyers’ home countries being applied and transferred across borders.84 
Therefore, the implementation and enforcement of non-domestic rules 
through private channels such as supply contracts may be viewed as a form 
of legal transplantation through private actors in the eyes of suppliers’ host 
countries, even though the objects to be transmitted are not limited to gov-
ernment-mandated laws in a foreign legal system but include private codes 
of conduct in global commerce with regulatory features as well.85 On top of 
that, the transposition across borders by MNEs of the aforementioned trans-
national voluntary codes with regulatory functions as well as their home-
country laws are carried out through transnational channels of private con-
tracting, rather than through typical state legislative, regulatory, or judicial 
processes at a national level.86 
Hence, we could develop a matrix to outline four types of legal trans-
plants for CSR standards, with transplant channels and transplanted objects 
of CSR norms as criteria for differentiating cells for each distinct type. The 














                                                                                                                           
ers with strong bargaining power condition business on implementation of vendor codes 
[such as SA8000 and other similar standards], in order to obtain business, suppliers accept 
the condition”) (alteration in original). 
 83 See supra Part I. 
 84 Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational Commercial Contracts: 
New Architectures, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1557, 1567 (2013). See infra Part III (discussing 
how Taiwanese suppliers have made supply-chain transparency efforts to help their US buy-
ers comply with CM rules under the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 85 Lin, supra note 16, at 730-34. 
 86 Id. at 713-15, 741. 
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Table 1: Matrix for the Legal Transplantation of CSR Standards 
 




regulatory agencies  























E.g., ISO 14001, as a 
private standard, was 
transferred into the 








Category 1 in Table 1 refers to the typical transplantation of foreign 
codified laws, regulations, or other public standards through public chan-
nels initiated by governmental organs in receiving countries, which is the 
traditional form of legal transplants in comparative law studies.87 Category 
3 indicates the transmission of voluntary private standards through public 
state channels. For example, the Chinese government systemically promot-
ed ISO 14001 by creating concrete measures and formally constructing the 
implementation platform for ISO 14001 in China.88  
By studying how Taiwanese suppliers complied with CM rules in or-
der to demonstrate legal transplantation through private contracting chan-
nels in a globalized world, this article is focused on transplanting state laws 
or transnational voluntary codes of conduct through supply contracts, as 
                                                     
 87 For instance, Taiwan has traditionally relied on the binary or dual board model (also 
known as the “two-tier system”) where both directors and supervisors (or company/statutory 
auditors) are elected by shareholders. However, from the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury until now, Taiwan’s legislative and executive branches have been collectively trans-
planting a unitary Anglo-American style of board of directors and independent directors (al-
so known as the “one-tier system”) into corporate governance structures, with audit 
committees replacing supervisors. Tsai, supra note 30, at 470-71.  
 88 See Lin, supra note 16, at 737. 
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shown in Categories 2 and 4 in Table 1.89 Specifically, recognizing the no-
tion that the transplant process can also embrace private channels (e.g. 
through supply contracts) in addition to traditional public state channels, 
Category 2 illustrates that state laws such as CM rules under the Dodd-
Frank Act were included in supply contracts and thus transmitted to other 
countries.90 Furthermore, if the transplanted objects could be voluntary 
codes of conduct with regulatory features, albeit not adopted as govern-
ment-mandated laws, then Category 4 denotes that the transnational volun-
tary codes exemplified by CM rules established by the EICC91 would be 
conveyed, through private contracting channels, into a land where such 
CSR norms have not yet been codified. In both Categories 2 and 4, global 
purchasing companies, as private regulators, would play an important role 
in not merely transposing CM rules but also in implementing or even en-
forcing them. Our case study on how Taiwanese suppliers comply with CM 
rules in Part III illustrates the aforementioned two types of legal transplants 
via private channels. 
III. CONFLICT MINERAL RULES 
To resolve concerns over CMs, two kinds of CM rules come into play 
in regulating their use: transnational voluntary codes (e.g. EICC Code of 
Conduct) and government-mandated laws (e.g. Sec. 1502 of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act).92 The creation of 
both of these CM rules could be attributed to the promotion of such con-
cerns by the UN and the OECD.93 Therefore, before carrying out the Tai-
wanese case study in Part III to look into the compliance practices of these 
two CM rules or the process of how these two distinct types of CM rules 
have already been transplanted into Taiwan, in Part II we will first discuss 
and summarize why and how they were created. 
The UN Resolutions 
The long-lasting armed conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and the Great Lakes region subjected people living there to serious 
                                                     
 89 As suppliers in receiving countries have to follow CSR rules inserted into supply con-
tracts by global buyers, this could also be interpreted as a form of legal transplantation. See 
id. at 720-22. 
 90 As discussed in Parts II.C and III, CM rules under the Dodd-Frank Act are U.S. buy-
ers’ home-country laws, which serve as an important reference for voluntary codes of con-
duct to incorporate into supply contracts. See id. at 721-22. 
 91 As discussed in Parts II.B and III, CM rules established by the EICC resemble the ISO 
14001 Environmental Management System as procedural rules, rather than substantive re-
quirements. See id. 
 92 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012)). 
 93 See infra Part II. 
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humanitarian and economic hardship, thus drawing attention away from 
global society. The UN Security Council decided in 2003 to ensure that any 
financial and military assistance being given to armed groups were 
stopped.94 The Panel of Experts assigned by the UN Security Council to in-
vestigate the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the nearby conflict re-
gions indicated in their 2003 report that some foreign manufacturers had di-
rectly or indirectly funded domestic armed groups via the procurement of 
minerals. As those foreign manufacturers were possibly unaware of the 
negative effects of their procurement, the Panel of Experts also tried to 
bring this issue to the attention of foreign buyers through cooperation with 
other international organizations such as the OECD as those foreign manu-
facturers were possibly unaware of the negative effects of their procure-
ment.95 
These investigations heightened the awareness of the international 
business community of their responsibilities on protecting human rights that 
were indirectly threatened by transactions in their supply chains for CMs.96 
The UN repeatedly sought to raise awareness on this issue via Resolutions, 
particularly Resolutions 1533 and 1698.97 The UN, in its Resolution 1857, 
called for international collaboration to prevent illicit transactions of raw 
materials from becoming sources of funding for local armed groups to step 
up their civil wars. 98 As a result, all Member States in the UN must now 
verify that their domestic importers, manufacturers, and consumers are 
aware of the origin of those minerals.99 The UN further required Member 
States to urge manufacturers, importers, and consumers of Congolese min-
eral products to conduct due diligence regarding the origin of CMs and their 
suppliers under Resolution 1896.100 
EICC Code of Conduct 
In addition to the public or governmental initiatives urged by the UN, 
private actors such as NGOs and international trade associations have also 
encouraged their members to take necessary measures to address CM prob-
lems. One representative example is the CFSI, co-established by the EICC 
(the U.S. trade association) and GeSI (the European NGO), in order to pro-
vide relevant certifications, build up a database of certified smelters and re-
                                                     
 94 S.C. Res. 1493, at ¶18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (Jul. 28, 2003). 
 95 Illegal Exploitation, supra note 1, at 9-12. 
 96 Id. at 11. 
 97 See generally S.C. Res. 1533, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1533 (Mar. 12, 2004); S.C. Res. 1698, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1698 (Jul. 31, 2006). 
 98 Supra note 5, at 6-7, 13, 15. 
 99 Id. Supra note 5, at 6-7, 13, 15. Id. 
 100 S.C. Res. 1896, at 14-16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1896 (Nov. 30, 2009). 
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fineries, and help their members procure conflict-free minerals.101 The 
EICC has further incorporated “Responsible Sourcing of Minerals” into the 
Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition® (EICC®) Code of Conduct 
(“EICC Code of Conduct”).102 At present, more than 100 EICC members, 
many of which are large MNEs, voluntarily comply with the EICC Code of 
Conduct.103 These organizations also require their first-tier suppliers to 
comply with this voluntary code in order to satisfy the EICC Code of Con-
duct’s requirements.104 Those EICC member businesses usually have trans-
national supply chains;105 therefore their foreign suppliers, especially the 
                                                     
 101 See the CFSI, supra note 7. See also Jeff Schwartz & Alexandrea Nelson, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and the Conflict Minerals Rule, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 328 (2016) (“The Conflict 
Free Sourcing Initiative (‘CFSI’), a non-governmental organization formed by affected in-
dustries, put together a survey that companies could use to ask their suppliers about where 
they obtained their conflict minerals”).  
 102 EICC, The Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition® (EICC®) Code of Conduct, 
http://www.eiccoalition.org/media/docs/EICCCodeofConduct5_English.pdf (last visited Jul. 
6, 2016)(on file with the authors). Under “Responsible Sourcing of Minerals,” the EICC 
Code of Conduct (Version 5.0, 2014) indicates: 
Participants shall have a policy to reasonably assure that the tantalum, tin, tungsten 
and gold in the products they manufacture does not directly or indirectly finance or 
benefit armed groups that are perpetrators of serious human rights abuses in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country. Participants shall ex-
ercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of these minerals and make 
their due diligence measures available to customers upon customer request. 
Id. at 9. Since the EICC just rebranded itself as the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA) in 
October 2017 to mark its next phase, we can also find new versions of the EICC Code of 
Conduct (EICC Code of Conduct (Version 5.1, 2016) and RBA Code of Conduct (Version 
6.0, 2018)), which all include the same “Responsible Sourcing of Minerals”. RBA, The RBA 
Code of Conduct Is a Set of Standards on Social, Environmental and Ethical Issues in the 
Electronics Industry Supply Chain, http://www.responsiblebusiness.org/standards/code-of-
conduct/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2017). 
 103 See EICC/RBA, Members, http://www.responsiblebusiness.org/about/members/ (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2017). 
 104 Id. (“In addition to [EICC/]RBA members, thousands of companies that are Tier 1 
suppliers to those members are required to implement the [EICC/]RBA Code of Conduct”) 
(alteration in original). However, the EICC Code of Conduct does not specify any sanctions 
and thus has to rely on market monitoring power; for example, “Microsoft, whose Xbox 
game system is assembled by Foxconn, said it has a code of conduct that suppliers are re-
quired to meet, including factory inspections, or they risk losing contracts.” Adam Satariano 
& Peter Burrows, No Company Follows Apple’s Expanded China Factory Audits, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2012), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2012-02-26/no-company-follows-apples-expanded-china-factory-audits. 
 105 See, e.g., Jason Dedrick et al., Who Profits from Innovation in Global Value Chains?: 
A Study of the Ipod and Notebook PCs, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 81, 91-93 (2009); 
Yuqing Xing & Neal Detert, How iPhone Widens the US Trade Deficits with PRC, 10-21 
GRIPS POLICY RESEARCH CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER 2-3 (Nov. 2010). 
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first-tier suppliers, may also face pressure from EICC buyers to abide by the 
rule of “Responsible Sourcing of Minerals” under the EICC Code of Con-
duct even if the suppliers themselves are not EICC members. 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States 
Sec. 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act is another example of CM rules that 
are public or government-mandated standards under U.S. law. Under Dodd-
Frank, however, several articles are designed especially for other public in-
terests. For example, Sec. 1502 was enacted “to bring transparency to sup-
ply chains in so-called ‘conflict minerals.’”106 
Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. Congress made several legisla-
tive attempts to require public companies to disclose their use of CMs, in-
cluding the two respective proposals of the Conflict Minerals Trade Act107 
and the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, both of which were proposed 
in 2009.108 The Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 clearly referred to the 
measures taken by the UN, the EICC, and GeSI as important reasons for 
proposing the bill.109 Although neither proposal was actually passed by 
Congress, these legislative efforts directly led to the creation of Sec. 1502, a 
humanitarian and CSR clause less relevant to the Dodd-Frank Act focused 
on financial reform.110 
Sec. 1502 contains five primary paragraphs including paragraph (b) to 
amend Sec. 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Securities Ex-
change Act”), which adds a new disclosure requirement of paragraph (p) 
under the Securities Exchange Act.111 This new disclosure provision author-
izes and requires the SEC to draft a detailed rule to regulate CM disclo-
sures, requiring annual disclosures of CM use from U.S. public companies 
(under paragraph (p)(1)(A)). U.S. companies must disclose whether CMs 
are potentially used in their manufacturing, and the efforts they make in or-
der to clarify the source of those materials (under paragraph (p)(1)(A)(ii)). 
Sec. 1502 also defined “conflict minerals” in paragraph (e) as basically con-
sisting of coltan, gold, cassiterite, and wolframite, if their production funds 
armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or its adjacent 
countries. Therefore, under Sec. 1502, enterprises that are issuers under the 
Securities Exchanges Act are obliged to investigate and monitor their pro-
duction chains. The SEC later published Rule 13p-1 in 2012 in accordance 
with Sec. 1502 to further clarify the requirements for industries to follow 
                                                     
 106 Schwartz & Nelson, supra note 101, at 289. 
 107 Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128. 111th Cong. (2009). 
 108 Celia R. Taylor, Conflict Minerals and SEC Disclosure Regulation, HARVARD BUS. L. 
REV. ONLINE 105, 108 (2012). 
 109 Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
 110 Taylor, supra note 108, at 108. 
 111 See Sec. 1502, supra note 92. 
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(the “SEC Final Rule”).112 The nuances of the SEC Final Rule are not di-
rectly relevant to this article but the disclosure procedure covered that issu-
ers have to abide by can be summarized as follows: 
Just as the legislation instructs, under the SEC rules the first step is 
for companies to determine whether conflict minerals are necessary 
to their products. If not, companies need not file anything. If a com-
pany does make use of conflict minerals, however, it is required to 
conduct a so-called “reasonable country of origin inquiry” (an 
“RCOI”) with respect thereto. If the RCOI does not reveal the pres-
ence of conflict minerals from the Congo region, the company need 
only file a Form SD, which must “briefly” describe the company’s 
RCOI process and its conclusion. The company also needs to post 
this information on its website. If the RCOI reveals that the company 
is sourcing conflict minerals from the Congo region or gives the 
company reason to believe that this is the case, then the company is 
required to conduct due diligence “on the source and chain of custo-
dy” of such minerals. If, based on its due diligence, the company de-
termines that its minerals are not actually from the Congo region, 
then it must briefly describe its due-diligence efforts, its RCOI, and 
its conclusion both on a Form SD and its website.113 
This legislation subsequently provoked several controversies: an im-
portant issue is whether it is appropriate to have a legal provision that seems 
to be a pure CSR mandate under securities laws, requiring companies “to 
audit their supply chains as vigorously as they are required to audit their fi-
nancials.”114 This may indicate that the SEC now bears more responsibility 
for and power to meet the provision’s humanitarian and public policy 
                                                     
 112 Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release, SEC Adopts Rule for Disclosing 
Use of Conflict Minerals (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/ 
PressRelease/1365171484002. For a flowchart summary and detailed explanation of the SEC 
Final Rule, see Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,283, 56,285-333 (Sept. 12, 2012) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 204.13p-1 & 249b.400). 
 113 Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129, 136 
(2016) (footnote omitted). The SEC instructed public companies to make their due diligence 
efforts by conforming to such “a nationally or internationally recognized due-diligence 
framework” as the OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Min-
erals from Conflict-Affected and High Risk Areas (“OECD Guidance”). Conflict Minerals, 
77 Fed. Reg. at 56,281 n.55; OECD, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply 
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (2nd ed. 2013), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf. As such due diligence efforts 
must be audited, the auditor’s role is to “assess whether the auditee is complying with the 
OECD Guidance and accurately describing its efforts in its [Conflict Minerals Report].” 
Schwartz & Nelson, supra note 101, at 295 (alteration in original).  
 114 David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the 
Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 330 (2011). 
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aims.115 In a pragmatic sense, whether the goal of the CM rules could be ac-
complished as designed remains a question, but costs for disclosure and 
compliance are thought to be higher than the SEC estimated.116 Moreover, 
soon after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, even the EICC and GeSI, 
both industry trade groups, expressed concern that the transparency of sup-
ply chains is not as highly prioritized as CM rules envisioned in the rule 
making.117 The uncertainty of difficulty in disclosures lead to further con-
cerns over threat of Rule 10b-5 liability under security laws.118 
Another intriguing issue is that both the violence in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo that Sec. 1502 was designed to curb and the foreign 
suppliers who would be pressured to comply with the CM rules are respec-
tively taking place and located outside the United States.119 In other words, 
Congress envisions that if U.S. businesses are to satisfy the disclosure re-
quirements, an extraterritorial goal will be met indirectly to regulate an en-
tire global supply chain.120 Apparently, according to the purpose of Sec. 
1502, this extraterritorial effect is desirable to legislators; as demonstrated 
in the Taiwanese case study, it may be an indirect cause of legal transplan-
tation of CM rules into Taiwan through private supply chain channels.121 
The filing results from the first-year disclosure effort may respond to 
the above query in part. After the first disclosure deadline, a study demon-
strated statistics from the filings that around 1,319 companies have filed 
Form SDs, fewer than the SEC expected.122 The industries falling within the 
                                                     
 115 Id.  
 116 Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic 
and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1315, 1334 (2012). 
 117 Id. at 1335. 
 118 Id. at 1338. 
 119 Woody, supra note 116, at 1342; Cafaggi, supra note 84 at 1568–70.  
 120 Woody, supra note 116, at 1342.  Under “Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s 
New Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog,” Congress adopted an indirect ap-
proach to assert its extraterritorial jurisdiction. Specifically, 
[e]xtraterritorial jurisdiction of section 1502 is indirect in that foreign firms not 
registered on an American exchange, and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction 
of the SEC, may be forced to comply with the provision because they are part of a 
supply chain in which the final product is manufactured by an issuing company. 
Although outside the reach of any SEC disclosure requirement or liability scheme, 
a foreign company may feel the pressure from an issuing company to have an en-
tire supply chain in compliance with section 1502, which may result in foreign 
companies rising to meet the standard required by the provision despite not facing 
any similar requirements in their home jurisdiction. 
Woody, supra note 116, at 1342. 
 121 See infra Part III. 
 122 Schwartz, supra note 113, at 144. 
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CM rules’ scope mainly include: (1) Semiconductors and Related Devices; 
(2) Electro-medical and Electro-therapeutic Apparatuses; (3) Motor Vehicle 
Parts and Accessories; (4) Radio and TV Broadcasting and Communica-
tions Equipment; (5) Surgical and Medical Instruments and Apparatuses; 
(6) Services-Prepackaged Software; (7) Pharmaceutical Preparations; (8) 
Computer Communications Equipment; and (9) Miscellaneous Electrical 
Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies.123 Among these businesses, almost 
seventy-five percent of those who further filed Conflict Minerals Reports in 
addition to their Form SDs mentioned that they had to request information 
from their suppliers;  however, this was not highly satisfactory.124 A handful 
of the reports disclosed the number of CM suppliers, which ranged between 
two to more than 40,000, with a median of 510; these figures show the ex-
tent to which the supply chains are fragmented, and global buyers rely on 
their suppliers to offer information to the SEC.125 Another interesting phe-
nomenon mentioned in the study is how the CFSI audit program has signif-
icantly lowered the cost of meeting the disclosure requirements for U.S. is-
suers by building up a database for certified smelters and refineries.126 
Nonetheless, the cost of CFSI audits is quite high for smelters and refiner-
ies, highlighting another problem that should not be omitted in the future.127 
At any rate, the aforementioned observation may reflect that the third-party 
certification or audit process does play a role in promoting compliance with 
the state or government-mandated laws for CM disclosure.128 
Summary 
This article is intended to illustrate the TPR or transnational private 
governance of CSR norms through global supply chains in general and to 
test whether the U.S. legislators’ expected and desired extraterritorial goal 
of Sec. 1502 to indirectly regulate an entire global supply chain can be met 
in particular. Using the Taiwanese case study presented in Part III, we will 
explore the process of how the following two distinct types of CM rules 
might have been transplanted into Taiwan through the private channel of 
supply chains: public government-mandated CSR standards under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, and private voluntary CSR standards written by the EICC. 
Although Taiwanese industries do not directly face any similar domes-
tic rules or requirements on CM disclosures, because Taiwan’s high-tech 
industries have been very much involved in transnational transactions and 
outsourcing, they may perform a crucial role in the legal transplantation of 
                                                     
 123 Id. at 145. 
 124 Id. at 150. 
 125 Id. at 150-51. 
 126 Id. at 173-74. 
 127 Id. at 169. 
 128 See supra Part I. 
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CM rules through global supply chains. In addition to those Taiwanese 
firms that are already EICC members129 or are listed on the U.S. stock mar-
ket so as to become public issuers (and are thus subject to the jurisdiction of 
the SEC as well as Sec. 1502),130 other companies may also need to comply 
with related CM rules in that they are part of a supply chain where final 
products are manufactured by a U.S. issuer subject to Sec. 1502 under secu-
rities laws, or that they may feel pressure from such voluntary rules as the 
EICC Code of Conduct owing to their buyers (who might be EICC mem-
bers and thus form an entire supply chain, in compliance with this private 
standard). Obviously, there are a certain number of Taiwanese suppliers in 
the electronics industry who have already voluntarily declared that they do 
not use CMs within their supply chains or have made such disclosures on 
their websites.131 
                                                     
 129 See EICC, supra note 103. For example, Hon Hai Precision Industry Company Lim-
ited (“Hon Hai,” also as known as Foxconn) is a renowned high-tech company incorporated 
in Taiwan. In 2005, Foxconn “[b]ecame a member of Electronic Industry Code of Conduct 
(EICC), dedicated to promoting corporate social and environmental responsibilities (herein-
after referred to as SER).” See Hon Hai/Company Milestones, FOXCONN Technology Group, 
Company Milestones, TECH. GRP., http://www.foxconn.com/ 
GroupProfile_En/CompanyMilestones.html (last visited Jul. 8, 2016). As discussed in Part 
I.C, Foxconn is Apple Inc.’s main supplier; although it is headquartered in Taiwan, its major 
factories are located in China. 
 130 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd. (TSMC) is also an EICC mem-
ber. See EICC, supra note 103. TSMC securities are registered with the SEC and listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange as well. Corporate Governance, TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR 
Manufacturing Company Limited, Corporate Governance,MFG. CO. LTD., http://www.tsmc. 
com/english/investorRelations/corporate_governance.htm (last visited Jul. 8, 2016). 
 131 For example, Sunrex Technology Co., Ltd. (Sunrex) is a laptop computer keyboard 
manufacturer listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Company Overview, SUNREX Technolo-
gyTECH. CO., LTD., Company Overview, http://www.sunrex.com.tw/en/about-
detail.php?id=5 (last visited Jul. 15, 2016). Sunrex has published a “Statement of Prohibition 
Regarding Usage of Metals from Congo’s Illegal Mines” on its website, emphasizing that: 
The social and environmental problems caused by Congo’s illegal mining areas 
have attracted the attention of Sunrex’s customers. In response to customer de-
mands and to fulfill our corporate social and environmental responsibilities, Sun-
rex has requested that its suppliers from the metals supply chain bear the following 
responsibilities: 01. Do not use metals from illegal mines or mines where mining 
operations are performed under poor working conditions. 02. Request upstream 
suppliers to not use metals from illegal mines in the Democratic Republic of Con-
go. 03. Look back on all products that contain “blood mineral” metals, such as 
gold (Au), palladium (Pd), tantalum (Ta), tin (Sn), and tungsten (W), to identify 
the mining areas where these metals came from. 04. Work with Sunrex and Sun-
rex’s customers to investigate the source of metals to ensure that metals originating 
from illegal mining areas are not used. 
Sunrex TechnologyConflict Minerals, SUNREX TECH. CO., LTD., http://www.sunrex.com.tw/ 
en/csr-detail.php?id=4 (last visited Jul. 15, 2016). 
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IV. CONFLICT MINERALS DISCLOSURES IN GLOBAL 
SUPPLY CHAINS: THE CASE OF TAIWAN 
According to the TPR theory,132 some Taiwanese industries may be 
examples of private actors under its conceptual framework. Also, if we take 
into account the role played by Taiwanese manufacturers, transnational 
supply contracts may become a channel for voluntary codes of conduct or 
foreign government-mandated laws to transfer into Taiwan, exerting influ-
ences on Taiwanese manufacturers even without formal legal transplanta-
tion of CSR standards such as CM rules initiated by the government. There-
fore, the aforementioned CM rules, whether voluntary or foreign-
government-mandated, may also generate a kind of “legal transplant” effect 
through supply chains as a medium of TPR. In Part III.B below, this article 
takes Taiwanese industries as an example: Through surveying a portion of 
Taiwanese suppliers, we can understand whether they are currently engag-
ing in CM investigations or disclosures, their incentives to abide by the CM 
rules, and the approaches they take. The Taiwanese case study would thus 
provide another example for legal transplantation through global supply 
chains in a globalized world. 
Study Design 
The main questions we seek to resolve through this empirical study 
are: 1. In terms of transplanted objects, although there are currently no gov-
ernment-mandated laws related to CMs in Taiwan, is any firm in Taiwan 
actually required to comply with any type of CM rules? 2. In terms of 
transplant processes or channels, have any legal transplants of CM rules 
through supply chains in Taiwan already occurred? 
In order to answer these questions, we conducted a survey on a group 
of Taiwanese businesses using a pre-designed questionnaire. The question-
naires were filled out anonymously. Because there is a lack of similar stud-
ies on this specific topic (focusing on legal transplants through supply con-
tracts with CM rules as an example), this study was designed as a pilot 
study. Due to limited resources, we did not take a census of the entirety of 
Taiwanese industries. We sent out the questionnaires with the help from the 
Supply Management Institute, Taiwan (“SMIT”), an NGO with members 
from many Taiwanese industries; SMIT helped us send the questionnaires 
to their trainee members.133 Most of the individual respondents worked 
                                                     
 132 See supra Part I. 
 133 The SMIT is an NGO whose main business is to provide professional training courses 
and supply management information for company procurement as well as to host related 
seminars or conferences. Since its creation in November 1992, “SMIT has trained more than 
5,000 purchasing and supply management professionals.” About SMIT, SUPPLY 
MANAGEMENT MGMT. INST., TAIWAN,  http://www.smit.org.tw/EN/ugC_AboutUs.asp (last 
visited Jul. 17, 2016). 
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within the procurement department. In this approach, we also contacted re-
spondents from a wide range of industries as well as in different positions 
within supply chains (e.g., upstream, midstream, or downstream). Before 
the formal survey, we did a pilot test on a group of targeted respondents in 
order to polish our questions. 
Here is the main structure of the questionnaires. Including the core 
question “whether the business for which the respondents work is involved 
in conflict minerals investigations or disclosures and why,” we designed 
several groups of questions as follows: 
1.   The position where the respondent’s business was within the sup-
ply chain. We asked about the basic company information (indus-
try, position in the supply chain, whether their shares are publicly 
listed in Taiwan or in the United States), in order to group re-
spondents into categories and to gain a basic understanding of their 
positons located in the supply chains. 
2.   Whether the respondent took any actions related to CM disclo-
sures, including merely conducting CM investigations or making 
follow-up disclosures in addition to the investigations, and, if so, 
the reason why the business in question did so. We also asked 
those businesses already taking relevant actions and the businesses 
that did not do so in order to understand the incentives/motivations 
for taking action (or deciding not to). 
A. For businesses conducting CM investigations: There are two 
groups of questions (although the grouping was not revealed in 
the questionnaires): 
i. The “incentive” group, including questions relevant to 
incentives to conduct CM investigations (e.g., whether 
they were required to by their buyers), and which appli-
cable non-domestic rules were applied. 
ii. The “investigative approach” group, including questions 
relevant to how the respondent actually conducted CM 
investigations: whether there was any standard or meth-
odology they applied, the personnel inside companies in 
charge of conducting CM investigations, etc. 
B. For businesses not yet conducting CM investigations: We asked 
why they did not do so and whether they might take action in the 
future. 
The questions in the questionnaires were multiple choice, except for 
the final question, which was open for further opinions. Some questions had 
an “other” option, which was designed to identify any other applicable 
standards or investigative methodologies. The questionnaire is outlined in 
Table 2, while its complete content is presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 2: Outline of the Questionnaire 
 




Business scale, industries, core products, 
position in the supply chain (in respective 
industries), whether their shares are listed in 
the Taiwanese or U.S. stock markets 
Background information 
(respondent—personally) 




investigations or taking 
other relevant actions 
The “incentive” group: 
The time and the incentive for the business 
to conduct CM investigations, and any ap-
plicable government-mandated laws or 
transnational voluntary codes of conduct 
The “investigative approach” group: 
Company department in charge of CM in-
vestigations, the adopted investigative ap-
proach, personnel involved, methodologies 
applied, the main buyer’s nationality, the 
time consumed during the first investiga-
tion, and any obstacles encountered 
For businesses not yet 
conducting CM 
investigations 
Main reason for not conducting a CM inves-
tigation, the reason for disclosure (albeit 
without CM investigation, if applicable), 
and the future possibility of conducting a 
CM investigation  
Other opinions Respondents may give any opinion on ac-
tions not included in the questionnaire 
 For the background information section, we referred to the classifica-
tion of respective industries formulated by the Taiwan Stock Exchange and 
Taipei Exchange134 to make a list to define the respective industries and il-
lustrate businesses within the respective streams of supply chains, as shown 
in Table 3, from which the respondents could select. We grouped together 
those industries that were more likely to be associated with CMs. As to the 
“others” group, we were still able to see the distribution within industries 
according to respondents’ answers of core products. As for the business 
size, we used the standard set by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(“MOEA”) to classify respondents into small- and medium-sized enterpris-
                                                     
 134 The Information Platform on Industrial Value Chains, TAIWAN STOCK EXCH. & TAIPEI 
EXCH., http://ic.gretai.org.tw/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). 
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es (“SMEs”) and non-SMEs.135 
 
Table 3: Industry Classification 
 
 Examples of businesses in 
respective industrial groups 
Industries Upstream Midstream Downstream 
A. Semi- 
conductors 



































                                                     
 135 Zhong Xiao Qi Ye Ren Ding Biao Zhun (2009 Xiu Gai) [Standards for Identifying 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (2009 Revisions) (Taiwan)], art. 2 (2009) [hereinafter 
SME Standards]. As we did the survey before the March 2015 amendment of SME Stand-
ards, we primarily applied the old pre-amendment version of SME Standards as follows: 
The term “SME” as used in the Standards shall mean an enterprise which has 
completed company registration or business registration in accordance with the re-
quirements of the laws, and which conforms to the following standards: (1) The 
enterprise is an enterprise in the manufacturing, construction, mining or quarrying 
industry with either paid-in capital of NT$80 million or less, or fewer than 200 
regular employees. (2) The enterprise is an enterprise in the industry other than any 
of those mentioned in the Sub-paragraph immediately above with either its sales 
revenue of NT$100 million or less in the previous year, or fewer than 100 regular 
employees. 
Id. 
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nents such as 
passive compo-
nents 



































H. Others To be answered by the respondent 
 
Before formally sending the questionnaires out, we did a pilot test on a 
small group of respondents from SMIT’s members in order to see if the de-
sign and wording of the questionnaires fit our purpose. We modified the 
questions and information provided in the questionnaires according to the 
results of the pilot test, including the industry classification as shown in Ta-
ble 3, which is the final version. We mainly modified descriptions for re-
spondents to more easily locate their groups. 
 
Analysis of Survey Results 
In this part we attempted an analysis of narrative statistics based on the 
survey data we collected from the respondents.136 We sent out online ques-
tionnaires to 1,200 respondents, set the collection period as one month, and 
received a final response rate of approximately 15.4 percent (i.e., 185 re-
spondents replied to our questions). What follows are the survey results 
from the respondents. 
                                                     
 136Because we were only concerned about those companies that were represented in each 
response, although we did ask some questions with respect to the personal information of the 
individuals who filled out the questionnaires, in the current analysis the term “respondent” 
generally denotes the company represented in each response. 
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Responses on the Current Status of CM Actions 
The first group of questions to be answered was whether any of the re-
spondents are currently taking any actions related to the issue of CMs. The 
responses are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: The Responses Regarding Taking CM-Related Actions. 
 
 Taking any action 
(including conducting CM 
investigations without 
follow-up disclosure and 
making relevant 
disclosures in addition to 
ex ante investigations) 
Not conducting CM 
investigations (including 
making disclosures without ex 
ante investigations and not 
taking any actions at all) 
U.S. 
listed 






46 (79%) 118 (93%) 
All 58 (100%) 127 (100%) 
 
Among all the responses, 58 respondents (31.4 percent) answered that 
their companies have carried out CM investigations to some extent; this 
group can be further divided into those that conducted investigations and 
then  publicly disclosed CM related information and those that only con-
ducted CM investigations without follow-up disclosure. The remaining two-
thirds of the respondents have not conducted any CM investigations at all, 
which will be discussed later in this part.137 
For the purposes of the study, we mainly focused on the responses 
from Taiwanese businesses that neither listed their shares nor were public 
issuers on the U.S. stock market; this group of 46 out of the 58 respondents 
answered that the companies have been taking actions, including CM inves-
tigations or disclosures. As discussed throughout this article, this group is 
referred to as the “action group.” The reason for focusing on this group of 
46 respondents was that theoretically they were not directly subject to any 
state law requiring them to carry out CM due diligence or disclosure, so 
their incentives to obey relevant CM rules turned out to be more intriguing. 
The incentives and practices of actions related to CMs taken by the action 
                                                     
 137 See infra Part III. 
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group of 46 respondents (i.e., the cell highlighted in grey in Table 4) were 
then analyzed from the perspective of legal transplantation through private 
contracting; they may account for two of the four categories under the legal 
transplant matrix of CSR standards as introduced in Table 1 (viz. Catego-
ries 2 and 4).138 
General Characteristics of the Respondents 
Despite the limitations of the study approach,139 we tried to compare 
the characteristics of the groups that conducted CM investigations (the ac-
tion group) with those of the group that did not (the no-action group). 
Numbers and proportions of industries within each group are shown in Ta-
ble 5. For the action group, the single largest group was the computer indus-
try, comprising about 29.3 percent; electric machinery was the second, 
comprising about 19 percent; the third and fourth were semiconductors and 
PCBs, comprising 13.8 and 12.1 percent, respectively. Although the num-
bers of these “top” industries were not necessarily larger than their counter-
parts in the no-action group, these proportions in the action group still 
showed that these industries were more likely to take action, compared to 
the other industries from which the respondents came. Eleven respondents 
were in the “others” group, distributed across different industries; according 
to the core products they said that they marketed or produced, they came 
from industries such as tourist/amusement enterprises, other manufacturing 
industries, retail, education, aviation, transportation, medicine, and medical 
equipment. 
When it came to business size, Table 6 shows that in the action group, 
32.8 percent of the respondents were SMEs, while 67.2 percent were larger 
companies. In contrast, in the no-action group, there was less difference in 
size between larger companies and SMEs, which were 48 percent and 52 
percent, respectively. This suggests that, among the respondents, larger 











                                                     
 138 See supra Part I. 
 139 See infra Part III. 
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Table 5: Numbers and Proportions of Industries within the Same 
Group 
 
 Action group No-action group 
Industry Responses Proportion 
 
Responses Proportion  
A. Semi-
conductors 
8 13.8% 10 7.9% 
B. PCBs 7 12.1% 4 3.1% 
C. Communica-
tion 
1 1.7% 1 0.8% 
D. Computers 17 29.3% 15 11.8% 
E. Flat panel 
displays 
2 3.4% 3 2.4% 
F. Electric ma-
chinery 
11 19.0% 16 12.6% 
G. Solar energy 1 1.7% 9 7.1% 
H. Others 11 19.0% 69 54.3% 
Sum 58 100.0% 127 100.0% 
 
Table 6: The Business Sizes of the Respondents 
 
 Action group No-action group 
Scale Responses Proportion Responses Proportion 







Sum 58 100.0% 127 100.0% 
 
After this preliminary analysis, we turned our focus to the action group 
to further explore their incentives for and approaches to conducting CM in-
vestigations or taking further actions. This revealed any traits illustrating 
the legal transplantation through global supply chains. 
Incentives for Conducting CM Investigations 
The “incentive” group of questions included Question 3 under Section 
II of the questionnaire, “The General Approach to ‘Conflict Minerals Dis-
closure’ in Your Company” (the incentive for conducting CM investiga-
tions for the first time) and the subordinate questions following Question 3, 
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“What were the laws or rules to follow, if any?” (Question 3a), “Which 
country was the major buyer from?” (Question 3b), “If the investigations 
were required by the buyer, did the buyer offer any assistance?” (Question 
3c), and “Were these requirements written into supply contracts?” (Ques-
tion 3d). The main goal of the aforementioned questions in this group was 
to understand the incentive for the action group to take such CM-related ac-
tions and whether and how the legal transplantation of CM rules such as 
government-mandated laws (e.g., the U.S. laws, standing for Category 2 in 
Table 1) or transnational voluntary codes of conduct (e.g., the EICC Code 
of Conduct, representing Category 4 in Table 1) occurred.140 
As shown in Table 7 below, we focused on the incentives and practices 
of CM-related actions taken by the action group of 46 respondents who 
were not U.S.-listed (i.e., the cell highlighted in grey in Table 4).141 Within 
this non-U.S.-listed action group, the most common incentive to take action 
to comply with CM rules was “being directly required to by their buyers,” 
as reported by about 65.2 percent of the respondents (30 responses). Other 
respondents reported that they conducted CM investigations to comply with 
standards they had adopted themselves long before (6.5 percent); to follow 
the market trend of their buyers in advance (21.8 percent); or to take the ini-
tiative without being required to or following a trend (6.5 percent). As for 
the standards with which they complied, almost all respondents answered 
either the EICC rules or U.S. laws (i.e., Sec. 1502). Specifically, for the re-
spondents whose incentive was “to comply with standards they had adopted 
themselves long before,” two respondents complied with EICC rules and 
one with U.S. law (to which they were not legally subject). For those whose 
incentive was to “follow the market trend of their buyers in advance,” eight 
respondents complied with EICC rules and two with U.S. laws. Further-
more, for those whose incentive was “being directly required to by their 












                                                     
 140 See supra Part I. 
 141 See supra Part III. 
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Table 7: The Incentives for the Non-U.S.-Listed Action Group 
 
Incentive 
Number of responses  










of buyers in 
advance 
8 (27.6%) 2 (14.3%) 0 (0%) 10 (21.8%) 
Being directly 









required to or 
following the 
trend 









According to the responses shown in Table 7, the most common moti-
vation for the respondents to conduct CM investigations was “being directly 
required to by their buyers”; the EICC rules were also more commonly fol-
lowed than Sec. 1502. This result might be due to the fact that the main in-
dustries influenced by CM rules (such as electronics and relevant indus-
tries) are possibly EICC members themselves, or suppliers of EICC 
members, thus making it easier for those buyers to continue applying the 
EICC Code of Conduct when requiring Taiwanese suppliers to conduct CM 
investigations. Obviously, EICC rules have already become the more preva-
lent standard for the respondents, even though they are only a set of trans-
national voluntary codes. 
In terms of the nationalities of their buyers for the respondents’ core 
products, the results for the non-U.S.-listed action group are shown in Table 
8. 
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Table 8: Nationalities of the Buyers of the Non-U.S.-Listed Action 
Group 
 
 Nationalities of the buyers for the respond-
ents’ core products 
Incentives Foreign Taiwanese Sum 
Investigating to 
follow the market 
trend of their 
buyers in advance 
2 (6.9%) 0 2 (6.2%) 
Being required to by  
their buyers 
27 (93.1%) 3 (100%) 30 (93.8%) 
Sum 29 (100.0%) 3 (100%) 32 (100%) 
 
Table 8 shows that for those directly required by their buyers to con-
duct CM investigations, or those actively doing so to follow the market 
trend of their buyers in advance, most of their buyers were foreign busi-
nesses. 
Overall, according to the responses from the non-U.S.-listed action 
group, a large proportion of them took CM-related actions to meet their 
buyers’ requests; also, most of their buyers were foreign businesses. These 
responses imply that the respondents from the non-U.S.-listed action group 
conducted CM investigations under pressure passed on through supply 
chains, resulting in Taiwanese companies actually complying with CM 
rules despite not actually having to do so initially. Under the legal trans-
plant matrix of CSR standards (as shown in Table 1),142 if these Taiwanese 
companies complied with Sec. 1502, then this could be an example of Cat-
egory 2 (such public standards as government-mandated laws transposing 
through supply contracts). For those complying with the EICC Code of 
Conduct, this could illustrate Category 4 (private, voluntary standards trans-
ferring through supply contracts). 
With regard to how those respondents as suppliers interacted with their 
buyers, in the questionnaires we added further questions for those whose 
incentives were “directly required to by their buyers” (the 30 respondents 
out of the non-U.S.-listed action group). These questions were designed to 
give us a basic understanding of the interactions between suppliers and 
buyers, in order to make comparisons with prior studies.143 
The answers from the 30 respondents from the non-U.S.-listed action 
group that were required by their buyers to conduct CM investigations are 
                                                     
 142 See supra Part I. 
 143 See supra Part I. 
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listed in Table 9 below. We found that the most common method of requir-
ing compliance was to put the requirements into supply contracts; this result 
is a little bit different from that of a past study that suggested that require-
ments expressed in “soft” form or informal arrangements were common.144 
However, it is also true that not all suppliers were strictly and expressly re-
quired to conduct CM investigations. 
 
Table 9: Whether Requirements on CM Investigations Were Written 
into Supply Contracts  
 
Form of requirements Respondents 
No, only orally required 4 (1.3%) 
Especially written into relevant contracts 16 (53.3%) 
Not clear 8 (26.7%) 
Not able to answer 2 (6.7%) 
Sum 30 (100.0%) 
As shown in Table 10, for those 30 respondents from the non-U.S.-
listed action group that were required by their buyers to conduct CM inves-
tigations, as to the question of whether they received any help from their 
buyers, most of the responses (23 responses) indicated that the buyers pro-
vided technical documents for reference; one of them said their buyer pro-
vided useful training; two of them said the buyers provided a great deal of 
practical assistance during investigations; and seven respondents stated that 
they did not receive any form of help at all. 
 
Table 10: Whether the Buyers Offered Any Support in CM Investiga-
tions145 
 
The extent of support Respondents 
Not at all 7 
The buyers provided technical documents for reference 23 
The buyers provided useful training  1 




Overall, some buyers provided support in CM investigations to some 
extent, but it was more common for them to offer technical documents for 
                                                     
 144 McBarnet & Kurkchiyan, supra note 73, at 68-70. 
 145With regard to this question, the respondents were permitted to choose plural answers, 
and so we have not provided percentages for each response. 
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reference only. For those respondents surveyed in Table 10, it was not 
common for their buyers to cooperate with suppliers in conducting CM in-
vestigations intensively. This result could be a supplement to actual practic-
es of CM investigations. 
Investigative Approaches 
The questions dealing with the investigative approaches taken by the 
action group start with Question 4. This set of questions provided additional 
information about actual investigative practices. 
Investigative Tools 
Question 4 in the questionnaire (please see the Appendix) asked what 
tools were to be adopted, and Question 4a asked why the respondents had 
adopted these tools in CM investigations. The reason for these questions is 
that we supposed the methodologies underlying more frequently used tools 
would probably form a set of CM-related standards to follow in the fu-
ture.146 The results are shown in Table 11. The most popular tool for CM 
investigations seems to be the toolkit devised by the EICC. However, some 
suppliers also developed their own tools rather than relying on general 
measures. 
As for the reasons to adopt the tools shown in Table 12, the most 
common answer was “being designated by the buyers”; next was “starting 
to adopt tools themselves after being required to conduct CM investiga-
tions” and then “complying by using currently adopted tools.” This result 
shows that it might be common for buyers to directly designate the tools to 
be used. This seems to be understandable if we take into account that the 
most common incentive for those respondents to take CM-related actions 
was “being directly required to by their buyers,” as shown in Table 7.147 
Therefore, it can be inferred that the investigative tools directly designated 
by the buyers are also passed on through supply chains. In addition, Table 
11 might suggest that the EICC-devised toolkit was adopted more preva-
lently than the OECD Guidance, which the SEC recommended to U.S. pub-
licly traded companies under Sec. 1502.148 This phenomenon is similar to 
the case demonstrated in Table 7, where respondents were more likely to 
follow EICC rules than Sec. 1502. Overall, this further indicates that private 
CM standards written by industries themselves (such as the EICC Code of 
Conduct and its investigative toolkit) in a bottom-up approach may prove 
                                                     
 146 As discussed above in Part II, even though CM rules require disclosure by regulated 
companies about the use of 3TG minerals in their manufacturing processes, there is still 
room for the regulated to choose actual tools or methodologies in conducting CM investiga-
tions. 
 147 See supra Part III. 
 148 See supra Part II. 
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more popular than public standards such as state laws enacted by a foreign 
government (such as Sec. 1502 and the OECD Guidance suggested by the 
SEC) in a top-down approach. 
 
Table 11: Tools Adopted 
 
Tools or methodologies Respondents 
EICC-related investigative tools 30 (65.2%) 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance149 4 (8.7%) 
Self-devised tools 9 (19.6%) 
Others 3 (6.5%) 
Sum 46 (100%) 
Table 12: Reasons for Adoption  
 
Reasons Respondents 
Complying by using currently adopted tools 10 (21.7%) 
Starting to adopt tools themselves after being re-
quired to conduct CM investigations  13 (28.3%) 
Being designated by the buyers  23 (50.0%) 
Sum 46 (100%) 
Investigative Practices 
This group of questions included Questions 5 and 7–10. The questions 
in this group were designed to give us a better understanding of CM inves-
tigative practices and some knowledge of the costs of complying with CM 
rules. 
We first asked those 46 respondents from the non-U.S.-listed action 
group150 whether they did so annually; their answers are shown in Table 13 
below. Most respondents in our survey have conducted CM investigations, 






                                                     
 149 As discussed in Part II.C, the SEC suggested that U.S. issuing companies concentrate 
their due diligence efforts by conforming to the OECD Guidance. Therefore, one of the op-
tions enumerated in Table 11 is the OECD Guidance. 
 150 See supra Part III. 
02. TSAI&WU - CONFLICT MINERAL RULES AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (DO NOT  DELETE) 3/2/2018  11:57 AM 
Conflict Mineral Rules and Corporate Social Responsibility 
38:233 (2018) 
273 
Table 13: Were CM Investigations Repeated Annually? 
 
Repeated annually? Respondents 
Yes 9 (20%) 
CM investigations are repeated but not conducted 
annually 23 (51.1%) 
No, the same set of data previously collected was 
used again 13 (28.9%) 
Sum151 45 (100%) 
 
When it comes to how they carried out CM investigations, the most 
common answer, as shown in Table 14 below, was to conduct CM investi-
gations by employees within the company themselves, instead of seeking 
professional support from outside the company. However, as shown in Ta-
ble 15 below, the most common way to satisfy the requirement to carry out 
CM investigations was to require their suppliers to report according to the 
required format of investigative tools. 
The aforementioned phenomena suggest that most of the suppliers in 
the action group were not at the final end of the supply chains. Hence it 
could be less costly for them to pass on investigative tasks to their suppli-
ers. However, this approach also implies that the requirements regarding 
CM investigations have been passed on through supply chains, meaning 
that CM rules could further influence respondents’ suppliers even if they 
only supplied production materials to the respondents. 
 
Table 14: The CM Investigative Approach (I) 
 
Who conducted CM investigations? Respondents 
All conducted by employees within the company 39 (84.8%) 
Working with third-party professionals, e.g. accounting 
firms 
4 (8.7%) 
Carried out by third-party professionals 3 (6.5%) 






                                                     
 151 There should have been 46 responses, but because one respondent did not answer this 
question, we have counted only 45 responses here. 
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Table 15: The CM Investigative Approach (II) 
 
Actual implementation Respondents 
Tracking all the information by the department in charge 
of conducting CM investigations 2 (4.3%) 
Only requesting the information from the suppliers 39 (84.8%) 
Both 4 (8.7%) 
Others 1 (2.2%) 
Sum 46 (100) 
  
Tables 16 and 17 (as asked in Questions 8 and 8a, respectively) report 
which department within a company is responsible for conducting CM in-
vestigations and how they do so. The data collected from the respondents 
indicated that most would not continually assign personnel exclusively for 
CM investigations and that the investigations were mostly carried out by the 
departments of procurement and supply chain management. Possibly be-
cause these two departments are on the frontline in terms of communicating 
with their own suppliers, they are assigned the responsibility of addressing 
CM issues. 
 
 Table 16: Whether There Are Personnel Exclusively Assigned for CM 
Investigations 
 
Personnel Exclusively Assigned Respondents 
Yes, and CM investigations are continually conduct-
ed by the same personnel 17 (37.0%) 
Yes, but on an ad hoc basis  14 (30.4%) 
No 15 (32.6%) 
Sum 46 (100%) 
 
Table 17: The Department in Charge of Conducting CM Investigations  
 
Department Respondents 
Procurement 19 (41.3%) 
Supply chain management 9 (19.6%) 
Legal  4 (8.7%) 
CSR  5 (10.9%) 
Others 9 (19.6%) 
Sum 46 (100%) 
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Table 18: Time Spent on CM Investigations 
 
Time spent Respondents 
1-2 weeks 6 (13%) 
2-4 weeks 18 (39.1%) 
4-8 weeks 14 (30.4%) 
8 weeks or more 8 (17.4%) 
Sum 46 (100%) 
 
According to Table 18 (as asked in Question 9), in terms of the time 
spent if the assigned personnel were carrying out CM investigations for the 
first time, most respondents replied that it took more than two weeks to 
conduct CM investigations, or even more than four weeks. This might be 
because the information required is not ordinary information managed by 
most companies, and therefore more time is spent tracking down these de-
tails. 
In Questions 10 and 6, respectively, we also asked about difficulties in 
conducting CM investigations (Table 19) and whether the investigations 
caused the respondents to institute any changes (Table 20). Their answers 
showed that the more common problems were the difficulties in tracking 
the origins of supplied materials and in obtaining cooperation from suppli-
ers, and the lack of resources to complete the investigations. Compared with 
the survey results presented in Table 15 above—that the most common way 
to satisfy the requirements for carrying out CM investigations is to rely on 
suppliers to offer information—it is evident that the difficulty in obtaining 
cooperation from suppliers was a key issue affecting whether respondents 
completed the investigations. This result seems to be consistent with the US 
study that a deficiency in suppliers’ cooperation in providing information is 









                                                     
 152 Schwartz, supra note 113, at 150. 
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Table 19: Any Difficulties in Conducting CM Investigations153 
 
Form of difficulties Responses 
Difficulty in obtaining cooperation from the suppliers 22 
Lack of resources to complete the investigations 16 
Difficulty in tracking the origins of supplied materials 
or the high cost of doing so 26 
No special difficulties 12 
Others 1 
 
Table 20 presents the responses to the question of whether there would 
be any changes to the respondents’ internal operation after CM investiga-
tions (as asked in Question 6 in the questionnaire). Although most respond-
ents did not change their suppliers, they still required their suppliers to help 
them comply with CM rules in the future or indicated that they would modi-
fy their systems for supply chain management. These results suggest that 
the respondents’ upstream suppliers still need to change their practices to 
meet their buyers’ requests to help comply with CM rules, or work with 
their buyers to carry out CM investigations and disclosures. This could in-
dicate that the regulatory effects of CM rules may continue being passed on 
through supply chains in the upstream direction. 
 




Suppliers are unchanged, but will further be required to 
provide CM-free materials  29 
Adjusting systems for supply chain management within 
the company 7 
Providing more training on the CM issues 6 
Suppliers changed  3 
No changes 10 
Others 0 
                                                     
 153 The respondents were permitted to choose plural answers for this question. 
 154 The respondents were permitted to choose plural answers for this question. 
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The No Action Group 
With regard to the group not conducting CM investigations, we asked 
why they did not take action and the possibility of future action. As shown 
in Table 4,155 127 respondents answered that they did not conduct any CM 
investigations at all. In the no-action group, however, three respondents an-
swered that they just made disclosures without ex ante investigations (as 
asked in Question 11a). As we are more interested in why the respondents 
did not carry out any CM investigations at all, we excluded these three re-
spondents from the statistics in Table 21, leaving 124 respondents’ replies 
(as asked in Question 11).  
Nevertheless, these three respondents who made disclosures without 
ex ante CM investigations replied that their products did not use any mate-
rials that involved CMs, and that this was why they did not carry out such 
investigations. This raised the question of why they still made the related 
disclosure (as asked in Question 11a). One replied that they did so because 
they were asked by the buyers to make nominal disclosures, while another 
stated that they did so merely to follow a previously adopted standard. 
These answers, albeit few in number, imply that even though businesses be-
lieve that their products do not involve CMs, they may still need to comply 
with CM rules to an extent. 
Table 21 below summarizes the reasons why other respondents did not 
carry out CM investigations. The most common reason offered (no matter 
which industries the respondent was involved in) was never being required 
to do so. The second most common reason was that their products cannot 
contain CMs. However, five respondents said they would like to conduct 
the investigations but had no resources with which to do so. Among the re-
spondents who cited “other reasons,” one revealed that their suppliers were 
all large international buyers who had already made CM disclosures them-
selves. In other words, even though there were respondents that had not yet 
conducted any investigation, some of them actually felt pressure to, but this 









                                                     
 155 See supra Part III. 
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Table 21: Reasons for No Action 
 
Reasons Respondents 
Never being required to conduct CM investigations 75 (60.5%) 
The products cannot contain CMs 35 (28.2%) 
Products could be CM-related but possessing no re-
sources to conduct CM investigations  
5 (4.0%) 
Others 9 (7.3%) 
Sum 124 (100%) 
Research Limitations on Interpreting the Results 
Although we tried our best to strike a balance between research re-
sources and meaningful results, due to the limitation of the research design, 
we have to acknowledge that there may be more work to do if the results 
are to be generalizable to all Taiwanese industries. As we did not take a 
census of all Taiwanese industries, some of the results, e.g., the ratios of in-
dustries involved or the common reasons for taking CM-related actions, 
cannot be taken as representative of whole industries. The second limitation 
was that because we did not have a fully detailed analysis of the general 
characteristics of the respondents (e.g., the actual numbers of businesses in 
each industry for the 185 respondents), we were not able to directly com-
pare the numbers and ratios we collected for whole industries in Taiwan. 
Neither were we able to determine if there was any difference between the 
respondents that replied to the questionnaires and those who did not; for ex-
ample, there was no way to know if, had the former been more familiar with 
CM issues, they would have been more willing to answer the questionnaires 
than the latter. 
Nonetheless, because the main goal of this article was to conduct a pi-
lot or pioneering study to provide rudimentary evidence of the legal trans-
plantation of CM rules of the two public and private types through private 
supply chain channels, the research limitations mentioned above might not 
constitute serious hindrances with regard to the main goal of this article.  
Summary 
Under the theoretical framework built with the role played by private 
governance in the context of the cross-border legal transplantation of CSR 
standards, Part III uses a Taiwanese case study to discuss the legal trans-
plantation of CM rules (including government-mandated laws and transna-
tional voluntary codes) through private contracting in a globalized world. 
This case study suggests a couple of noteworthy phenomena. 
First, to address the concerns regarding CMs, there are two kinds of 
CM rules in play in regulating CM use: transnational voluntary codes, such 
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as the EICC Code of Conduct, and government-mandated laws, such as 
Sec. 1502 under the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act. The creation of both CM rules 
could be attributed to the promotion of such concerns by the UN and the 
OECD.156 
Second, when it comes to regulatory influence on suppliers in global 
supply chains, Sec. 1502 and the SEC Final Rule are government-mandated 
laws, which can be really binding on U.S. issuing companies. As for U.S. 
buyers’ suppliers in other jurisdictions or countries around the world, it is 
more common for them to act under compliance pressure from the EICC 
Code of Conduct or other voluntary soft rules. In other words, in the inter-
national market for CM rules, the EICC might perform a more active role 
than Sec. 1502, which was reflected in the Taiwanese case study, a majority 
of the respondents complied with the EICC, whether directly or indirectly. 
Therefore, what distinguishes this article from previous work is that 
the Taiwanese case study could imply that Taiwanese suppliers complied 
with the CM rules developed by the EICC to a greater extent than those en-
acted under the Dodd-Frank Act (including the SEC Final Rule and the 
OECD Guidance, suggested by the SEC as a toolkit for carrying out due 
diligence). When it comes to adopting or implementing transnational CSR 
standards in suppliers’ countries through private contracting in global sup-
ply chains, this study could suggest that private standards developed by the 
industries themselves or NGOs in a bottom-up approach might be more ef-
fective or widely acceptable than public or state laws enacted by a foreign 
government in a top-down approach. This might be proof that private 
standards can sometimes be more effective or widely acceptable in regulat-
ing MNEs when voluntary codes established by private organizations com-
pete with public or regulatory laws.157 It is also an illustration of transna-
tional private governance of CSR standards in general, or private 
implementation and enforcement of CM rules under global supply chains in 
particular. 
Furthermore, more than half of the respondents from the non-U.S.-
listed action group answered that they adopted the investigative tools as-
signed by their buyers, and those tools might therefore constitute a quasi-
standard followed widely within supply chains. This might suggest that the 
buyers, by designating investigative tools for their suppliers to use, could 
have the ability to decide the actual approach or methodology used to com-
ply with CM rules in supply chains collectively. 
Finally, most respondents from the non-U.S.-listed action group fur-
ther required their own upstream suppliers to provide information to help 
meet their buyers’ requirements in conducting CM investigations. In other 
words, these respondents might further pass on CM rules to other upstream 
                                                     
 156 See supra Part II. 
 157 See Wielsch, supra note 54, at 1076-77. 
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Taiwanese or foreign suppliers, thus extending the regulatory reach of ap-
plicable CM rules along supply chains. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are two significant findings in terms of the transplant pro-
cess/channels and transplanted objects. First, as demonstrated in Table 1 
(the matrix for the legal transplantation of CSR standards), the legal trans-
plant literature typically focuses on legal transplants through public or gov-
ernmental channels (i.e., Categories 1 and 3).158 This article, however, deals 
with an emerging phenomenon: legal transplants through private contract-
ing in global supply chains.159 Private actors have transplanted a variety of 
private and public laws or standards across jurisdictions through private 
contracting over the last few decades. By looking into how Taiwanese sup-
pliers have made transparency efforts to help their buyers comply with CM 
rules established by the transnational electronics industry themselves and by 
the U.S. government respectively, in this article we argue that CSR codes of 
conduct vividly exemplify this type of legal transplantation through private 
channels, such as contractual control in global supply chains (please see 
Categories 2 and 4 in Table 1). Specifically, by examining legal transplants 
through private contracting in a globalized world, this article assesses Tai-
wanese industries’ compliance with these two types of CM rules. By ex-
ploring the compliance practices of Taiwanese suppliers through the use of 
questionnaires, we found that some Taiwanese companies have started to 
follow CM rules because of their supply contracts, which demonstrates that 
applicable CM rules have been transplanted into Taiwan through supply 
contracts even without formal legal transplantation initiated by the govern-
ment. 
Second, as for transplanted objects, the Taiwanese case study indicates 
that Taiwanese suppliers more often comply with CM rules developed by 
the EICC than those enacted under the Dodd-Frank Act. This finding indi-
cates that private standards developed by industries themselves or NGOs in 
a bottom-up approach (please see Category 4 in Table 1) may be more ef-
fective or widely acceptable than public standards or state laws enacted by a 
foreign government in a top-down approach (please see Category 2 in Table 
1) when it comes to adopting or implementing transnational CSR standards 
in suppliers’ countries. This article proffers a theoretical analysis of how 
Taiwanese suppliers helped their buyers comply with the two kinds of CM 
rules, suggesting that private, soft rules might be accepted more easily or 
play a more viable regulatory role than public or state laws from buyers’ 
countries in the context of transnational private governance or global gov-
                                                     
 158 See supra Part I. 
 159 This theme was also illustrated in Professor Li-wen Lin’s article in 2009. See general-
ly Lin, supra note 16. 
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APPENDIX A: THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The electronic version of the questionnaire used in this study has been 
converted into the set of questions listed below, which are English transla-
tions of the original Chinese version. 
 
I. Background Information 
1. Company information: Please provide us with information about 
your company 
(1) The industry and 
its main products 
(please refer to the 
Annex for industry 
classification on the 
final page)160 
A. Semiconductors; B. Printed circuit boards 
(“PCBs”); C. Communications; D. Computers; E. 
Flat panel displays; F. Electric machinery; G. So-
lar energy; H. Others 
Main products [_____________] 
It is in the [upstream], [midstream], or [down-
stream] of the industry 
(2) Scale* A. Small and medium-sized enterprises 
(“SMEs”) 
B. Other larger companies 
(3) Listed on Tai-
wanese stock mar-
ket? 
A. Listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange 
B. Listed in General Stock Board run by Taipei 
Exchange 
C. Neither 




2. Personal Information:  
(1) Which depart-
ment in your compa-
ny do you work for? 
A. Procurement 
B. Supply chain management  
C. Legal 
D. CSR  
E. Other (please specify___________) 
(2) Which of the fol-
lowing rules or laws 
are the most familiar 
to you?**  
A. Conflict minerals (“CM”) rules (Sec. 1502) 
under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act  
B. The EICC Code of Conduct 
C. Neither  
D. Both are familiar 
II. The General Approach to “Conflict Minerals Disclosure” in Your 
Company  
                                                     
160 The Annex listing industry classifications is included herein as Table 3, in Part III. 
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sults on your web-
site? 
A. Investigated and disclosed 
B. Investigated but not disclosed 
C. Disclosed without conducting any investiga-
tions 
D. Neither 
If your answer to Question 1 was “C” or “D”, please jump to Question 
11 
2. When did your 
company conduct 
its first CM inves-
tigation? 





F. 2013 or after 2013 
3. What was the in-
centive for your 
company to con-
duct CM investiga-
tions for the first 
time? 
A. We were directly required to by our buyers 
B. Investigating to follow the market trend of our 
buyers in advance 
C. Investigating to comply with standards long 
adopted by ourselves 
D. To take the initiative in investigations without 
being required to or following the trend 
3a. What were the 
laws or rules to 
follow, if any? 
A. The EICC Code of Conduct 
B. Required to by the US SEC (that is, CM rules 
under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act) 
C. Other international standards 
D. Other 
3b. For your prod-
ucts involving 
CMs, in which 
country was the 
major buyer lo-
cated? 
A. The United States  
B. An EU Member State 
C. Japan 
D. Other (please specify ____________) 
 
* Definition of SMEs: according to the Standards for Identifying Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises published by the Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs, SMEs are de-
fined as follows: 
The enterprise is an enterprise in the manufacturing, construction, min-
ing or quarrying industry with either paid-in capital of NT$80 million or 
less, or fewer than 200 regular employees. 
The enterprise is an enterprise in an industry other than those men-
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tioned in Subparagraph A above with either a sales revenue of NT$100 mil-
lion or less in the previous year, or fewer than 100 regular employees. 
** According to the definition under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, CMs referred to tantalum, tin, 
tungsten, and gold. The production of these minerals could originate in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and its adjacent countries. Transactions 
involving these minerals may potentially fund armed groups in these coun-
tries. These same minerals are defined under the EICC Code of Conduct. 
 Annex: Industry Classification 
 
